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UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES AND THE
EQUAL PAY ACT:
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ANALYZES A
SALARY DISPUTE IN
STRAG V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES'
LAURA WOODWORTH KEOHANE
The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982), like other
laws affecting employment relationships, presents particular chal-
lenges for universities and colleges as employers. The Act was
enacted in 1963, as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, in order to remedy the problem of sex discrimination
in wage setting.2 Application of the Act can be straightforward
when pay practices are overtly discriminatory; for example, in
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,3 the Supreme Court affirmed a
holding that an employer had violated the Act when, among other
things, the employer had maintained separate male and female
seniority lists.4
When the employer is a college or university, however, more
complex concerns come into play.5 A convincing argument can be
made that federal courts should show some measure of deference
to the academic standards and values employed in a university's
internal processes, 6 because colleges and universities differ from
other employers in several important respects. In principal,
unlike other employers, academic institutions are called upon by
society to preserve intellectual freedom and to advance intellec-
1. 55 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1995)
2. See Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
3. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
4. Id. at 193-94. In Coming Glass Works, male employees changing shifts
retained higher wages under a "red-circling" agreement. Id. at 194. "Red-
circling" is the retention of an employee's prior salary upon being transferred to a
lower-paid position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.26 (1988).
5. See generally Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 738 F.2d 431 (4th Cir.
1984) (discussing risk of infringement upon college's First Amendment rights
presented by action under the Equal Pay Act), affd, 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987).
6. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing
factors that make a tenure decision unique); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67
(2d Cir. 1980) (courts should refrain from inferring discrimination from a
comparison among candidates).
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tual inquiry. One federal court has described the delicate balance
between eliminating discrimination and preserving academic free-
dom as follows:
A university's prerogative to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach is an important part of our long tradition
of academic freedom. Although academic freedom does not include
the freedom to discriminate, this important freedom cannot be dis-
regarded in determining the proper role of courts called upon to
try allegations of discrimination by universities in teaching
appointments. 7
The special concerns affecting colleges and universities in the
context of an Equal Pay Act claim were highlighted in the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Strag v. Board of Trustees.' In Strag, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiff, a female mathematics
instructor at Craven Community College, had failed to establish a
prima facie case under the Act because she could not show that
she was performing work substantially equal in skill, effort, and
responsibility to a selected male comparator under similar work-
ing conditions.9 Further, the court went on to observe that sum-
mary judgment was proper because, even if the plaintiff had
properly established a prima facie Equal Pay Act case, the college
had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the salary dis-
parity was based on a factor other than sex.10
Thurza Strag was hired at Craven Community College (here-
inafter referred to as "the college") as a mathematics instructor in
1987. She possessed a master's degree and had nine years of
teaching experience at the college level. Strag's starting salary at
the college was $16,200 per year, which was $1,020 less than she
had earned at her prior position at East Carolina University.
Strag stated that she voluntarily took the pay cut because she no
longer wished to make a 100-mile-per-day commute from her
home to the East Carolina University campus. Strag's $16,200
7. Lieberman, 630 F.2d at 67. Although the excerpted language refers to
tenure decisions, and occurs in a discussion of a Title VII claim, rather than an
Equal Pay Act claim, a similar level of concern is present with respect to salary
determinations under the Act, because a college or university's ability to bid
competitively for faculty members will affect the quality and dimensions of its
academic programs. 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1218 (1957) (citations
omitted)
8. 55 F.3d 943 (1995).
9. Id. at 950.
10. Id. at 950-51.
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salary was an "on scale" salary, authorized under the college's Sal-
ary Plan."
The same year the college also hired Linwood "Buddy" Swain
as a biology instructor. Swain possessed a master's degree and
had twenty-four years of secondary school teaching experience.
Swain's starting salary at the community college was $33,000, a
higher salary than the $28,391 he had earned the previous year as
a teacher at New Bern High School. If Swain had remained at
New Bern High School for the next school year, his salary would
have exceeded $30,000. Swain's salary was awarded under a
"Special Salary Designation" contained in the college's Salary
Plan. The "Special Salary Designation" permitted the college to go
"off scale" when it could not obtain an exceptionally qualified
teacher with an ordinary "on scale" salary. 12
Six years later, in September 1993, Strag filed a complaint
seeking back pay and injunctive relief in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under the
Equal Pay Act.' 3 Strag selected Swain as her sole professional
"comparator" for purposes of her Equal Pay Act claim. 14
The Equal Pay Act provides as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this sec-
tion shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex. 15
Under the Act, in order to establish a prima facie case, the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that she: (1) receives lower
pay than a male co-employee; (2) for performing work substan-
tially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility under similar work-
11. See generally Strag, 55 F.3d at 946 (discussing facts of case).
12. Id. at 947.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
14. See id. at 947.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
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ing conditions. 1 6 This comparison must be made factor by factor
with an opposite-sex comparator. 17 Thus, the establishment of a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act essentially hinges on
the selection of a proper comparator.'
In the Strag case, the college argued that Swain was not a
proper comparator for Strag's Equal Pay Act claim. The Fourth
Circuit agreed, concluding that Strag's choice of Swain as a com-
parator was improper because:
1) Swain was employed by the college's Biology department,
whereas Strag was employed by the Mathematics department,
two departments requiring different skills and responsibilities;
2) Swain had more responsibilities than Strag because he not
only taught normal lecture classes, but also instructed lab classes,
which required extra preparation. For example, Swain was
responsible for preparing for extra classes, supervising lab assist-
ants, and writing and grading extra exams. In addition, these lab
classes generally lasted longer than lecture classes;
3) Swain was the only full-time instructor for several science
courses, including biology, botany, zoology, and genetics, whereas
Strag shared responsibility for the courses she taught with other
math teachers, and did not teach many of the advanced math
courses. 19
Under these facts, the court observed that Strag failed to
meet her burden of showing that she performed work substan-
tially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility under working condi-
tions similar to Swain's.20 Indeed, Strag "did no more than prove
16. Strag, 55 F.3d 943, 948 (4th Cir. 1995); Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic
Inst, 10 F.3d 204, 206 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d
151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing requirements for a prima facie case under
the Equal Pay Act); Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620, 623 (11th
Cir. 1991) (same). A finding of intentional sex discrimination is not required to
sustain liability under the Equal Pay Act in the Fourth Circuit. See Bartges v.
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1322 n.2
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (citing Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc, 36 F.3d 336, 344
n.17 (4th Cir. 1994)); Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 993 n.13 (4th Cir. 1986).
17. Strag, 55 F.3d at 948; Houck, 10 F.3d at 206. The plaintiff must identify a
particular comparator for purposes of her inquiry, and may not compare herself
to a hypothetical or "composite" co-employee. Strag, 55 F.3d at 948; Houck, 10
F.3d at 206.
18. Strag, 55 F.3d at 950; see also Soble v. University of Maryland, 778 F.2d
164, 167 (4th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must show that the comparison she is making
is an appropriate one).
19. Strag, 55 F.3d at 950.
20. Id.
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that she and Swain are paid different salaries."21 Thus, she did
not put forth a sufficient prima facie case under the Equal Pay
Act.
The result in Strag falls firmly within the Fourth Circuit's
established jurisprudence with regard to Equal Pay Act claims
when a college or a university is the employer. In nearly every
case in which the Fourth Circuit has analyzed an Equal Pay Act
claim in the higher education context, the court has affirmed
either a grant of summary judgment, or a dismissal of the action,
based on the plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case. For
example, in Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute,22 the plaintiff,
a professor in Virginia Tech's College of Education, failed to make
a prima facie case because she failed to identify any individual
comparators at all. "She did not compare teaching loads other
than to state that her load was low and that other faculty mem-
bers taught more students .... [Sihe failed to identify and com-
pare herself in any way to any male receiving a higher level of
compensation."23 Thus, because the plaintiff in Houck did not sin-
gle out an actual comparator instead of a hypothetical one, dismis-
sal of her suit was proper.24
Similarly, in cases where the plaintiff has identified a specific
comparator, but the comparison clearly is an unsuitable one, the
Fourth Circuit has not hesitated to uphold summary judgment in
the college or university's favor. For example, in Ritter v. Mount
St. Mary's College ,25 summary judgment in the college's favor was
proper where the plaintiff, an untenured faculty member,
attempted to designate the Chair of the Department of Education
as a comparator in connection with her Equal Pay Act claim.26
Likewise, the plaintiff in Soble v. University of Maryland27 failed
to put forth a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, because
the evidence showed that she did not perform work substantially
equal in skill, effort, and responsibility to that performed by her
chosen comparator. The plaintiff in Soble was a tenured professor
in the university's School of Dentistry, who taught in the School's
Department of Oral Health Care Delivery. She possessed a
21. Id.
22. 10 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993).
23. Id. at 206.
24. Id.
25. 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987).
26. Id. at 993.
27. 778 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Master of Social Work and a Ph.D. in Education Psychology. The
only other non-dentist in the School of Dentistry was a man with a
Masters in Business Administration who taught dental manage-
ment and organization and carried a considerably heavier teach-
ing load than Soble. Thus, the district court's grant of summary
judgment in the university's favor was proper.28
A similar result was reached in a 1993 Fifth Circuit case
where the employer was a university, Chance v. Rice University.2 9
In Chance, the plaintiff, an English professor, failed to establish a
prima facie claim when she chose as her comparator the Chair of
the English Department.3 0 A plaintiff's failure to establish a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act in the context of a col-
lege or university also is illustrated in a case decided by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Jacobs v. College of William and Mary.3 In Jacobs, the plaintiff,
a women's basketball coach at the college, failed to establish a
prima facie case under the Act because the evidence showed that
the men's basketball coach had greater responsibilities.3 2 In order
to establish a case of discrimination, the court noted,
it must be proved that a wage differential was based upon sex and
that there was the performance of equal work for unequal compen-
sation, and while the jobs in question need not be identical, they
must be substantially equal.33
In other words, the Act
requires "factual support of an accusation that the employer paid
the aggrieved employee wages at a rate less than the rate at which
he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work
28. Id. at 167.
29. 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 152-53. In addition, in Chance, the University's defensive position
may have been enhanced by its extensive internal review processes. For
example, the court noted that in response to the plaintiff's initial allegations of
discrimination, Rice officials reviewed her past internal evaluations, and asked
other scholars, both within and outside Rice, to critique her published works. Id.
at 152. The university also presented as evidence two reports prepared by its
Commission on Women, a group formed by Rice's president to investigate
matters involving Rice's female employees. Id. at 153 n.10. The result in Chance
indicates that effective internal investigation of employment disputes can
decrease the likelihood of liability flowing from such matters.
31. 517 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1985).
32. Id. at 798.
33. Id. (citing Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
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on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
conditions."
3 4
In Bartges v. University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 5 the
United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina explicitly applied the Fourth Circuit's holding in Strag in
granting summary judgment to the University of North Carolina
at Charlotte (UNC-C), in connection with an Equal Pay Act claim
made by a female former part-time head softball coach and part-
time assistant basketball coach.3 6 In Bartges, the plaintiff alleged
that specific employees, the Head Baseball Coach, the Head Vol-
leyball Coach, the Head Golf Coach, and the Assistant Men's Bas-
ketball Coaches, performed substantially equal work under
substantially similar conditions.3 7 The district court disagreed,
concluding that the plaintiff had failed to put forth a prima facie
claim because several key differences in responsibilities and
expectations distinguished her working conditions from those of
her comparators:
1) The Head Baseball Coach was responsible for a thirty-two-
member team, whereas Bartges was responsible for a fifteen-
member softball team;
2) The Head Baseball Coach was a full-time position (and
also required supervision of another full-time coach), whereas
Bartges' position as Head Softball Coach was part-time;
3) Likewise, the Head Volleyball Coach also vas a full-time
position;
4) With respect to a comparison with the Head Golf Coach,
Bartges failed to show how any comparison supported her claim,
because she was paid more for her coaching work than either of
the two individuals who held the position of Head Golf Coach dur-
ing the time she worked at UNC-C;
34. Id. (quoting Ammons v. ZIA Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971)). See
also Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1452 (2d Cir. 1995) (plaintiff
acknowledged that male comparator "had responsibilities she did not share");
Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994)
(male comparator's responsibilities "differed substantially from the duties
imposed upon [the plaintiffT); Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College Ass'n,
935 F.2d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (no prima facie case under Equal Pay Act where
plaintiffs salary was $24.00 more than one comparator's and $150.00 less than
the other's).
35. 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
36. Id. at 1323-24.
37. Id. at 1322.
1997] 339
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5) Bartges was a part-time Assistant Coach of the women's
basketball team, whereas the Assistant Coach positions for the
men's team are full-time positions; and
6) The university's uncontested evidence showed that men's
basketball was the most marketable and largest revenue produc-
ing sport at UNC-C; thus, the men's basketball Assistant Coach
positions entailed greater public relations, recruiting, and other
coaching responsibilities, as well as more pressure to produce win-
ning teams .3
In addition, the district court went on to observe that, in
attempting to combine her two part-time positions to justify com-
parison to other full-time positions, Bartges "has made the very
comparisons with hypothetical or composite males that cannot be
used to prove a violation of the Equal Pay Act."3 9 Because Bartges
failed to identify an appropriate male comparator, summary judg-
ment in the university's favor was proper.4 °
As may be seen in Strag and the other cases discussed above,
it is difficult for a plaintiff in an Equal Pay Act action in a college
or university setting to establish a prima facie claim under the
Act. However, assuming a plaintiff in such a case has sufficiently
established a prima facie case of salary discrimination under the
Equal Pay Act, the burden shifts to the employer to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the pay differential is justified
by the existence of one of the four exceptions set forth in the stat-
ute: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system that
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a
differential based on any factor other than sex.4 ' If the burden of
any of these affirmative defenses is successfully carried by the
employer, "the plaintiffs claim must fail unless the plaintiff can
satisfactorily rebut the defendant's evidence."42
In Strag, even though the plaintiff was not able to establish a
prima facie case under the Act, the court nonetheless went on to
examine whether the pay differential between Strag and Swain
was justified under one of the four statutory exceptions.43 The
38. Id. at 1323.
39. Id. at 1324 (citing Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943, 948 (4th Cir.
1995)).
40. Id. at 1324.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982); Strag, 55 F.3d at 948; Houck v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst., 10 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1993).
42. Strag, 55 F.3d at 948.
43. Id. at 950-951.
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court concluded that the college clearly had carried its burden of
proving that the salary disparity was based on factors other than
sex, the fourth exception under the Act.44 The college met its bur-
den of showing that the salary differential between Strain and
Strag was based on factors other than sex by pointing to the fol-
lowing facts:
1) Swain was extremely well known and respected in the
community for his innovative Coastal Biology class;
2) Swain had established a reputation as an excellent and
innovative teacher with a great deal of experience;
3) Swain used state-of-the-art technology in his classes which
other teachers did not use;
4) Swain had twenty-four. years of teaching experience, as
compared to Strag's nine years;
5) Swain's salary at the public high school would have been
$30,000 for the school year in question, as compared to Strag's
$17,220 salary at East Carolina University;
6) Swain was unwilling to take a pay cut in order to teach at
the college, whereas Strag was willing to do so in order to avoid a
long commute; and
7) Swain was a much better known teacher than Strag, and
the administration felt that hiring him would attract more stu-
dents to the college.45
As the Fourth Circuit's language in Strag illustrates, under
the "broad general exclusion" of the Act's fourth exception, dis-
crimination in compensation that is grounded in "differences
based on experience, training, or ability" is not prohibited under
the Act.46 Because so many Fourth Circuit cases interpreting the
Equal Pay Act in the college or university context conclude that no
prima facie claim exists, there is a paucity of jurisprudence in this
circuit regarding the application of the "factors other than sex"
exception in this context.47 Nonetheless, the court's application of
the fourth statutory exception in Strag echoes similar decisions
both within and without the Fourth Circuit. For example, in Rit-
ter v. Mount St. Mary's College, the Fourth Circuit observed that
"a difference in job qualifications between the plaintiff and the 'job
44. Id.
45. Id. at 951.
46. Id. at 949.
47. See, e.g., Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst, 10 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir.
1993) (plaintiffs failure to establish a prima facie claim means that affirmative
defense is not before the court).
19971 341
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comparator,' the person or persons to whom the plaintiff chooses
to compare her job status, salary, etc. for the purposes of estab-
lishing liability on an EPA claim, can constitute a 'factor other
than sex.'"4" The first, second, third, fourth, and seventh factors
listed by the court in Strag would appear to fall under the rubric
of "difference[s] in job qualifications."
The "factors other than sex" defense often is successful for a
college or university employer. For example, in a Ninth Circuit
case decided in 1994, Stanley v. University of Southern Califor-
nia ,49 the court observed that the record showed significant differ-
ences between the plaintiffs and the comparator's public relations
skills, credentials, experience, and qualifications. 5° Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction.51 Similarly, in Schwartz v. Florida Board of Regents,5 2
the plaintiff, a male professor in the College of Education at Flor-
ida State University, sustained his burden of proving that a pay
disparity existed, thus shifting the burden to the university to
show non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity.53 Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Circuit in Schwartz affirmed judgment in the univer-
sity's favor, based upon the district court's explicit finding that
factors other than sex caused the pay disparity:
The district court's findings of fact require a conclusion that
the salary disparity resulted from factors other than sex. The dis-
trict court found as a fact that discretionary raises given in the
disputed years were based upon the following factors: outstanding
service to the university, administrative duties, publications,
research, supervision of doctoral students, and performance ....
These factors are not based on sex and are sufficient to sustain an
employer's burden to show that the salary disparity does not
result from sex discrimination.54
48. Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 993 (4th Cir. 1987)
(citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719,
722 (4th Cir. 1980)).
49. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
50. Id. at 1321-22.
51. Id. at 1325-26.
52. 954 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1991).
53. Id. at 622.
54. Id. at 623. The statute's first enumerated affirmative defense, a seniority
system, also can be successful for a university or college employer. For example,
in Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), the plaintiff, a female
professor denied tenure in the college's Biology department, produced evidence of
a consistent salary disparity between herself and a male professor in the same
department. Id. at 1453. However, the evidence also showed that the male
342 [Vol. 19:333
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Just like the Fourth Circuit in the Strag case, the district
court in Bartges examined the university's affirmative defense
under the Act's fourth exception, even though the plaintiff had
failed to establish a prima facie case under the Act.55 The court
concluded that there was "no genuine dispute concerning whether
the wage paid to Bartges result[ed] from factors other than sex
within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) such that the Uni-
versity has not violated the Equal Pay Act."5 6 According to the
court, any of the three reasons advanced by UNC-C established
that the university's treatment of Bartges resulted from factors
other than sex:
1) Bartges' qualifications: Bartges attempted to evaluate her
salary against the salaries paid to three Assistant Basketball
Coaches for the men's team: Melvin Watkins, who had played four
years of intercollegiate basketball at UNC-C and who had been
coaching at UNC-C for ten years when Bartges first joined the
staff; David Pendergraft, who had been an Assistant Coach at
East Carolina University for six years before coming to UNC-C;
and Kevin Billerman, who had played intercollegiate basketball at
Duke University, played and coached professional basketball in
Europe, coached high school basketball for eight years, and had
been coaching at UNC-C for four years when Bartges first came to
the institution. In contrast to these three coaches, Bartges had
played basketball in high school but did not play intercollegiate
basketball. Her coaching experience consisted of one year as a vol-
unteer Assistant Women's Basketball Coach at Penn State Uni-
versity, and one year as a high school girls' basketball coach.5 7
Similarly, Bartges' qualifications were not comparable to
those of the Head Volleyball Coach, James McClellan. Before
coming to UNC-C, McClellan had been Head Volleyball Coach at
Bellarmine College and had ten years of head coaching experience
at Morehead State University. The district court observed that
these comparisons indicated "dramatic differences in experience
and professional success."58
comparator was placed on tenure track three years before the plaintiff, and
remained ahead of her. Id. "Since [the male comparator] was more senior than
plaintiff, it cannot be deemed unreasonable for Vassar to pay him more money."
Id.
55. Bartges v. University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312,
1324-27 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
56. Id. at 1324.
57. Id. at 1324-25.
58. Id. at 1325.
343
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Bartges also attempted to compare her qualifications to those
of two Head Baseball Coaches, Gary Robinson and Loren Hibbs.
Robinson had ten years of experience coaching for UNC-C and had
three years of experience before he came to the university. Before
UNC-C hired Hibbs, Hibbs had six years of coaching experience at
Wichita State University, where his team had had an outstanding
record of success, including a national championship. In contrast
to these baseball coaches, Bartges had played softball in high
school, and had played slow-pitch softball during two summers in
college, but she had never played intercollegiate softball and had
no experience as a softball coach at any level when she was hired
for that position.59
Based on these facts, the district court in Bartges concluded
that the university had produced evidence that its "compensation
decisions were based [on] the prior playing and coaching experi-
ence of its coaches as well as demonstrable success in the coaching
field."60 The court acknowledged that the precise value to be
placed on professional qualifications is "somewhat subjective," but
quoted Strag for the principle that "subjectivity is essentially
inevitable in employment decisions; provided that there are
demonstrable reasons for the decision, unrelated to sex, subjectiv-
ity is permissible."6 1 Ultimately, concluded the court, the univer-
sity was entitled to summary judgment because it had
"established that its compensation decisions were based on a fac-
tor other than sex within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1)(iv)."62
2) The relative importance of Women's Softball within the
university's sports programs: In support of its motion for sum-
mary judgment, the university explained that, because of budget-
ary constraints, it was forced to prioritize spending within the
Department of Athletics. The "high priority" sports were men's
basketball, men's baseball, and men's soccer (three men's sports),
and women's basketball, women's volleyball, and women's soccer
(three women's sports). Other sports, including women's softball,
were considered "low priority." All of the high-priority sports had
full-time coaches, whereas none of the low-priority sports (men's
or women's) had full-time coaches. Thus, the low compensation
for the part-time Women's Head Softball Coach is explained by
59. Id. at 1324-25.
60. Id. at 1324-25.
61. Id. at 1326.
62. Id.
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these budgetary constraints, which constitute "reasons unrelated
to sex."
63
3) The prevailing wage and the employment market: The uni-
versity also argued that the salary of the Women's Softball Coach
was shaped by the employment market. In essence, the university
stated that, because Bartges had been willing to do the job for the
salary she was paid, it did not need to pay her more.64 The district
court agreed with this position, stating that it would "not second
guess the University's business decision."65
As the cases discussed in this article indicate, many different
fact patterns can fit within the broad language of the Equal Pay
Act's "factor other than sex" defense:
The Act's factor other than sex defense is the most broadly
worded of all the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act. The statute
does not define the scope of the defense; nor does it state a stan-
dard for determining what qualifies as a "factor other than sex."
As a result, [this affirmative defense] is often the subject of
litigation. 6
Although the meaning of the Act's fourth enumerated excep-
tion is not made clear by the Act's language itself, judicial inter-
pretation of the statute has shown that the parameters of the
exception are quite broad. For example, it is clear from federal
appellate court case law that seemingly subjective factors such as
"statements of peer judgments as to departmental needs, collegial
relationships and individual merit" can constitute evidence of a
factor other than sex in an Equal Pay Act dispute.67
63. Id. at 1326-27.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1327. In general, consideration of the marketplace value of an
employee's skills is an appropriate consideration under the Act. "An employer
may consider the marketplace value of the skills of a particular individual when
determining his or her salary.... Unequal wages that reflect market conditions
of supply and demand are not prohibited by the EPA." Stanley v. University of
Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994). But see infra notes 67-
69 and accompanying text (discussing risk of perpetuation of market-based
disparities in salaries by sex).
66. See Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note, When Prior Pay Isn't Equal Pay: A
Proposed Standard for the Identification of 'Factors Other than Sex" Under the
Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1085, 1087 (1989). The Note's author
elaborates that "the exception's broad scope originates from Congress' awareness
of the impossibility of listing every conceivable factor" for a pay differential. Id.
at 1096.
67. See Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College, 935 F.2d 974, 976 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1991); see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1436 (2d Cir. 1995)
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As noted above, five of the seven "factors other than sex" set
forth by the Fourth Circuit in Strag fall within the category of
differences in education, training, qualification, or experience.
The fifth and sixth factors listed by the court, however, concern
Strag's and Swain's salaries before each was hired by Craven
Community College. As a general matter, an employer's reliance
on prior salary in setting compensation can be helpful, because "a
previous employer's pay may sometimes be used as an indicator of
market demand, and thus qualifies to excuse an employer from
liability under the factor other than sex defense:" 68
Reference to previous pay enables [employers] to determine
what competitors are paying, so that they can ascertain the salary
necessary to "induce" a job candidate to accept an offer of employ-
ment, and to make an initial determination of the value of an
employee's skills at a time when the employer has not yet had the
opportunity to establish the value of those skills.6 9
At the same time, however, reliance on a previous employer's
pay as a "factor other than sex" sometimes is suspect, because
such reliance can perpetuate market-based disparities, thus
7ndermining the Equal Pay Act's anti-discriminatory purpose.70
A legal standard embodying use of market value of an employee's
services, as indicated by a previous employer's salary, might be
tainted by the presence of discrimination depressing one sex's
wages. 7 ' In addition, looking to prior pay as a "factor other than
sex" can impose practical difficulties on a defendant, because this
("[Slenior members of the biology department simply did not like Fisher and did
not wish to establish a career-long professional association with her. It is
arguable that such grounds alone justified the department's recommendation
• . ."); Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620, 623 (11th Cir. 1991)
(subjective business justifications are legitimate factors to be considered). If,
however, subjective concerns are a facade for discrimination, or if they are overly
subjective so as to render them incapable of being rebutted by the plaintiff, their
consideration is impermissible. See Brousard-Norcross, 935 F.2d at 976 n.3;
Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 623.
68. Note, supra, at 1091 (discussing Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714
(8th Cir. 1980)).
69. Note, supra, at 1102.
70. See Note, supra, at 1102-1103; see also supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
71. See Note, supra, at 1103. In other words, the continued presence of a
persistent, unexplained market-based differential between men's and women's
earnings calls into question courts' ability to rely on the market as a justification
for pay disparities. Id.
[Vol. 19:333346'
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factor places the employer in the position of defending an unequal
compensation arrangement that was not of its own making. 72
Despite these difficulties, the Fourth Circuit in Strag applied
the "factors other than sex" exception properly; the court did not
rely solely upon Strag's and Swain's prior salaries, but looked to
other business-related factors that were considered in wage-set-
ting, such as the differences in Strag's and Swain's skills, experi-
ence, reputation, and expertise.73 For university and college
employers, it will be relatively simple to avoid over-reliance on
prior salary as a "factor other than sex" in Equal Pay Act claims,
because, in almost every situation, there will be factors other than
prior salary available to the college or university when compensa-
tion is set. Factors such as teaching skill, education, experience,
research productivity, acquisition of grant money, service on uni-
versity or college committees, and even seemingly subjective fac-
tors such as collegiality, can all provide a defensible basis for an
institution's salary-setting decisions. 4
72. Note, supra, at 1103-04.
73. See Note, supra, at 1105-1106 (discussing diminishing importance of prior
salary over time).
74. As may be seen in the discussion of cases in this article, cases interpreting
the Equal Pay Act when a university or college is an employer tend to fall into
two types: cases where the plaintiff is a teacher, instructor, or professor; see, e.g.,
Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995) ("professor" case); Strag v.
Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1995) ("professor" case); Houck v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 10 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993) ("professor" case); Chance
v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 151) ("professor" case); Brousard-Norcross v.
Augustana College, 935 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1991) ("professor" case); Schwartz v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1991) ("professor" case); Ritter v.
Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987) ("professor" case); Soble v.
University of Maryland, 778 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1985) ("professor" case); and cases
where the plaintiff is a coach; Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13
F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) ("coach" case); Bartges v. University of North Carolina
at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995) ("coach" case); Jacobs v. College
of William and Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("coach" case). Arguably,
concerns such as academic freedom are less applicable when the employment
dispute involves a coach rather than a professor. However, complex professional
considerations demanding the exercise of judgment appear to be present for
university or college coaches as well as for university or college professors. See,
e.g., Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1321 (coach required to conduct twelve outside speaking
engagements per year, to be accessible to the media for interviews, and to
participate in certain activities designed to produce donations and endorsements
for the athletic department). Thus, with respect to both coaches and professors,
an element of subjectivity will be present in employment decisions. See Strag, 55
F.3d at 949 ("professor" case discussing subjectivity); Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at
1326 ("coach" case discussing subjectivity). Generally, courts do not distinguish
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Assuming that federal courts continue to respect academic
freedom, and to show some measure of deference to institutions'
internal academic standards, it will be possible for colleges and
universities to set salaries in accordance with institutional needs
and goals, and to remain well-defended against potential Equal
Pay Act claims. However, colleges and universities with pay dis-
parities, whose "factors other than sex" defense proves to be
pretextual, may be vulnerable to attacks under the Act. 75
between the "coach" cases and the "professor" cases when analyzing the Equal
Pay Act. See, e.g., Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1322, 1323, 1226 ("coach" case citing
and applying three different Fourth Circuit "professor" cases).
75. See Brousard-Norcross, 935 F.2d at 976 n.3 (subjective judgments are to
be disregarded if "they are a facade for discrimination"); Note, supra, at 1104
(discussing employer's reliance on previous pay as a pretext for discrimination).
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